Fernando Gamez-Montoya v. Merrick Garland


NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 14 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT FERNANDO ALONSO GAMEZ- No. 19-71468 MONTOYA, AKA Fernando Gamez- Montoya, Agency No. A202-013-861 Petitioner, MEMORANDUM* v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted April 12, 2021** San Francisco, California Before: SCHROEDER and BADE, Circuit Judges, and JACK,*** District Judge. Fernando Alonso Gamez-Montoya, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Janis Graham Jack, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We review the agency’s “legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence.” Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citations omitted). Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, we deny the petition for review. 1. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. The IJ found material, non-trivial inconsistencies between Gamez- Montoya’s hearing testimony and his February 2015 credible fear interview with a law enforcement officer, in which he stated that he was “not at all” fleeing from any problems in Mexico and that he crossed the border simply “[b]ecause it is nice to be over here compared to being in Mexico.” While Gamez-Montoya offers alternative explanations for these statements, nothing in the record compels us to adopt a conclusion contrary to that of the BIA. See Pedro-Mateo v. I.N.S., 224 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[F]or us to disturb the Board’s decision, [a petitioner] must show that the evidence not only supports . . . but compels reversal.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). Moreover, Gamez-Montoya’s multiple voluntary returns to Mexico during the period when he was supposedly experiencing threats were inconsistent with his 2 statements to the IJ that he feared returning to Mexico. See Loho v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1016, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2008) (“It is well established . . . that an alien’s history of willingly returning to his or her home country militates against a finding of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution.”). As was his failure to apply for asylum during any of his previous crossings into the United States. Again, while Gamez-Montoya offers alternative explanations for his behavior, no evidence compels a finding that the BIA’s adverse credibility determination was error. Accordingly, we reject Gamez-Montoya’s argument that the agency’s adverse credibility determination was unsupported by substantial evidence.1 2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Gamez- Montoya failed to demonstrate that he was more likely than …

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