UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 19-4760 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JEFFERY JERMAINE JOE, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:17-cr-00768-JFA-1) Submitted: March 30, 2021 Decided: April 22, 2021 Before KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. G. Wells Dickson, Jr., WELLS DICKSON, PA, Kingstree, South Carolina, for Appellant. Kathleen Michelle Stoughton, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Jeffery Jermaine Joe pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to possession with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine base, and cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). On appeal, Joe’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether the district court (1) complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Joe’s plea; (2) erred in overruling Joe’s objections to the career offender designation, the firearm enhancement, and the drug quantity attributed to him; and (3) imposed an otherwise reasonable sentence. Joe has filed a pro se supplemental brief arguing that the district court erred by designating him a career offender, declining to grant an additional one-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, imposing a four-year term of supervised release, and considering dismissed counts of the indictment as relevant conduct. We affirm. Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and determines the defendant understands, the rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty, the charge to which he is pleading, and the maximum and mandatory minimum penalties he faces. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991). The district court also must ensure that the plea was voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or promises not contained in the plea agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), and “that there is a factual basis for the plea,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). Here, the district court failed to inform Joe of the right to counsel at every stage of the proceeding, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(D), the potential immigration 2 consequences of the plea, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(O), and the court’s authority to order restitution or asset forfeiture, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(J), (K). We conclude that these minor omissions did not affect Joe’s substantial rights, that he entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily, and that a factual basis supported the plea. See DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 116, 119-20. We therefore affirm his conviction. Next, we review a criminal sentence for reasonableness “under a deferential abuse- of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). This review requires consideration …
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