NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 10 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT AGUSTIN SUAREZ-LOPEZ, No. 17-71657 Petitioner, Agency No. A205-491-404 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted April 7, 2020** Before: TASHIMA, BYBEE, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges. Agustin Suarez-Lopez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law, Cerezo v. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008), except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing statutes and regulations, Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 2004). We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2014). We deny the petition for review. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Suarez-Lopez failed to establish that his past harm rose to the level of persecution. See Duran- Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019) (“although it may have been possible for the IJ to conclude that the threats were sufficiently serious and credible to rise to the level of persecution, we cannot say the evidence compels the conclusion”); Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000) (persecution is an “extreme concept” that includes the “infliction of suffering or harm”). The agency did not err in finding Suarez-Lopez failed to establish membership in a cognizable social group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (in order to demonstrate membership in a particular group, “[t]he applicant must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question’” (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014))); see also Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2016) (concluding that “imputed wealthy Americans” 2 17-71657 returning to Mexico does not constitute a particular social group); Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding “returning Mexicans from the United States” did not constitute a particular social group). We reject as unsupported by the record Suarez-Lopez’s contention that the BIA applied the incorrect legal standard in its cognizability analysis. Substantial evidence otherwise supports the agency’s determination that Suarez-Lopez failed to demonstrate that the harm he fears in Mexico would be on account of a protected ground. See Zetino v. ...
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