NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1944-19 ALAN J. MEYERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SUSAN M. MEYERS, Defendant-Respondent. _________________________ Argued October 14, 2021 – Decided December 21, 2021 Before Judges Gilson, Gooden Brown, and Gummer. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County, Docket No. FM-18-0775-10. Grant W. Waterson argued the cause for appellant (Skoloff & Wolfe, PC, attorneys; Grant W. Waterson and Patrick T. Collins, on the briefs). Bonnie C. Frost argued the cause for respondent (Einhorn, Barbarito, Frost & Botwinick, attorneys; Bonnie C. Frost, of counsel and on the brief; Matheu D. Nunn, on the brief). PER CURIAM In 2011, after thirty years of marriage, the parties divorced, and plaintiff agreed to pay defendant just over $12,900 per month in permanent alimony. In 2016, plaintiff moved to reduce his alimony, representing that he had lost his executive-level job, was disabled, and was unable to work. In 2018, the parties signed a consent order under which defendant agreed to accept a reduced alimony of $3,200 per month. Shortly thereafter, defendant learned that plaintiff had taken a new executive-level job with a high salary. She moved to vacate the consent order under Rule 4:50-1. Following a plenary hearing, the family court found that the consent order had been procured by plaintiff's fraud and it would be unconscionable to enforce the consent order. Accordingly, the family court vacated the consent order, reinstated plaintiff's prior support obligations, and awarded defendant fees. Plaintiff appeals, arguing the consent order incorporated the parties' settlement agreement and that agreement should have been enforced, defendant did not prove fraud, the settlement agreement was not unconscionable, and the family court erred in awarding fees to defendant. We reject these arguments and affirm. A-1944-19 2 I. The parties were married in October 1979 and divorced in January 2011. The judgment of divorce incorporated a marital settlement agreement (MSA), through which they resolved the issues concerning their divorce, including support obligations. At the time of their divorce, plaintiff, the former husband, was the Chief Scientific Officer of Revlon, and he was receiving a base salary of $450,000 per year plus an annual bonus. Defendant was not employed at that time. Under the MSA, plaintiff agreed to pay defendant $12,916.68 per month in permanent alimony plus 32.85% of his gross bonus. Plaintiff also agreed to pay the cost of defendant's health insurance until she was eligible for Medica re and to maintain life insurance to secure his support obligations. In 2014, plaintiff's employment with Revlon ended. He sued Revlon, contending that he was a victim of discrimination and anti-whistleblowing retaliation. In March 2015, plaintiff settled with Revlon and received $3,500,000, which included …
Original document
Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals