NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 6 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ALBERTO MENDOZA-ORTEGA, No. 17-71566 Petitioner, Agency No. A076-730-670 v. MEMORANDUM * MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Immigration Judge’s Decision Argued and Submitted January 17, 2019 San Francisco, California Before: WALLACE and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and ADELMAN, District Judge. ** Petitioner, Alberto Mendoza-Ortega, has been ordered removed to Mexico. He petitioned for a deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Lynn S. Adelman, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation. (“CAT”). To obtain such a deferral, he ultimately would have needed to show that “it is more likely than not that he . . . would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). Torture is defined as “pain or suffering . . . inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Id. § 208.18(a)(1). A beating or killing satisfies the definition of “torture.” Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008). Petitioner would not have needed to show that the government would torture him, but rather that the “government acquiesces in torture” of individuals in a similar situation. Id. “Acquiescence by government officials ‘requires only that [they] were aware of the torture but remained willfully blind to it, or simply stood by because of their inability or unwillingness to oppose it.’” Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 771 (9th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original; internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bromfield, 543 F.3d at 1079). Because Petitioner was convicted of an aggravated felony, he was subject to an expedited removal process. Thus, a first step in Petitioner’s CAT application was the “reasonable fear determination.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(b). This is a streamlined process beginning with an interview in which an asylum officer determines whether the petitioner reasonably fears torture if removed. The asylum officer must find that the petitioner has a reasonable fear if the petitioner 2 establishes “a reasonable possibility” that he would be tortured in the country of removal. Id. § 208.31(c). The parties agree that the standard governing this determination is the same as the standard for establishing a “well-founded fear” of persecution in the asylum context. See Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 809 n.4 (9th Cir. 2018). To meet this standard, the petitioner’s fear must be “both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.” Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1191 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922, 924 (9th Cir. 2004)). The subjective component is satisfied by credible testimony that the applicant genuinely fears torture. See Bartolome, 904 F.3d at 809. As is relevant to this case, ...
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