NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT __________ No. 20-3139 __________ ANTONIO DIAZ-RAMOZ, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA __________ On Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A202-029-942) Immigration Judge: Steven A. Morley __________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on October 29, 2021 Before: GREENAWAY, JR., KRAUSE, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges (Filed: December 17, 2021) __________ OPINION* __________ * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Antonio Diaz-Ramoz, a Honduran national, petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial of his application for asylum and for withholding of removal. For the reasons set forth below, we will deny the petition. I. DISCUSSION1 As relevant to our decision today, Petitioner argues that the BIA erred in concluding that he failed to establish a likelihood of persecution on account of his membership in either of his two proposed particular social groups (“PSGs”), as required to qualify for asylum or withholding of removal.2 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A); Jian Zhau Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 266 (3d Cir. 2008). To satisfy the “on account of” or nexus requirement, “the applicant bears the burden of proving that one central reason for the persecution was a protected characteristic.” Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 685 (3d Cir. 2015). He must show, in 1 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b) and 1240.15, and we exercise jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Where, as here, “the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decisions and orders as well as [conducted] an independent analysis, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions and orders,” Ordonez-Tevalan v. Att’y Gen., 837 F.3d 331, 340–41 (3d Cir. 2016), and look to the IJ’s opinion “only where the BIA has substantially relied on that opinion,” Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 2009). We review legal conclusions de novo, Doe v. Att’y Gen., 956 F.3d 135, 141 (3d Cir. 2020), and defer to factual findings “if they are supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence in the record considered as a whole,” S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 543 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). 2 As we affirm the BIA on this ground, we have no occasion to address Petitioner’s other arguments, which concern IJ’s adverse credibility finding and the BIA’s determination that one of his PSGs lacked social distinction. 2 other words, that membership in a PSG was “an essential or principal reason for the persecution,” id., and not simply an “‘incidental, tangential, or superficial’ reason,” Ndayshimiye v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 130 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting In re J-B-N- & S- M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (BIA 2007)). The BIA did not err in concluding that Petitioner failed to meet that burden here. …
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