NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 18 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT AUREA ORTEGA-REYES, No. 20-70079 Petitioner, Agency No. A076-658-468 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted August 31, 2020** Pasadena, California Before: SILER,*** BERZON, and LEE, Circuit Judges. Aurea Ortega-Reyes (“Ortega”) petitions for review of a final removal order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition because Ortega’s proposed social group is not * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. cognizable within Mexican society. Additionally, there is insufficient evidence to compel a contrary conclusion on fear of future persecution and the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) claim. Cf. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992) (explaining that the BIA’s decision should not be reversed unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion). 1. To establish past persecution, Ortega must show “(1) an incident, or incidents, that rise to the level of persecution; (2) that is on account of one of the statutorily- protected grounds; and (3) is committed by the government or forces the government is either unable or unwilling to control.” Doe v. Holder, 736 F.3d 871, 877-78 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted). An asylum applicant can demonstrate persecution on account of a statutorily- protected ground by showing that she was persecuted based on “membership in a particular social group.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). For a proposed social group to be cognizable, it must be: “(1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.” Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). To meet the third element, the distinction need not be a physical one: “to be socially distinct, a group need not be seen by society; it must instead be perceived as a group by society.” Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 212-18 (B.I.A. 2 20-70079 2014). The task, then, is determining “whether a proposed particular social group’s shared characteristic or characteristics would generally be recognizable by other members of the community, or whether there was evidence that members of the proposed group would be perceived as a group by society.” Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the IJ and BIA correctly concluded that Ortega’s proposed particular social group comprised of “displaced Mexican women who are relatives of famil[ies] involved in land disputes with organized crime” was not ...
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