Banuelos-Galviz v. Barr


FILED United States Court of Appeals PUBLISH Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 25, 2020 Christopher M. Wolpert FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court _________________________________ JOSE ANGEL BANUELOS- GALVIZ, Petitioner, No. 19-9517 v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. _________________________________ Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals _____________________________ Mark Robert Barr, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner. William C. Minick, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Linda S. Wernery, Assistant Director, with him on the briefs) for Respondent. _________________________________ Before HOLMES, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________ BACHARACH, Circuit Judge. _________________________________ This petition involves qualification for a remedy known as “cancellation of removal,” which allows noncitizens to avoid removal under certain circumstances. To qualify for cancellation of removal, noncitizens must continuously stay or reside in the United States for a minimum number of years. The requirement varies based on whether the noncitizens are lawful permanent residents. If the noncitizens are lawful permanent residents, they must have continuously resided in the United States for at least seven years. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2). All other noncitizens must have continuously been present for at least ten years. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A); see Part 1, below. The period of continuous presence terminates upon service of “a notice to appear under § 1229(a)” according to a provision known as the “stop-time rule.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1). This case involves the relationship between the stop-time rule and the statutory requirements for notices to appear. Under these requirements, a notice to appear must include the time of the removal hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i); see Part 1, below. When the time is missing, the notice to appear does not trigger the stop-time rule. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2018). But what if an incomplete notice to appear is followed by a notice of hearing that supplies the previously omitted information? We conclude that the stop-time rule is still not triggered. In our view, the stop-time rule is triggered by one complete notice to appear rather than a combination of documents. 2 1. Mr. Banuelos was served with a deficient notice to appear and a subsequent notice of hearing that supplied the date and time of his removal hearing. Mr. Banuelos entered the United States in 2006. Roughly three years later, Mr. Banuelos was served with a document labeled “Notice to Appear.” By statute, a notice to appear must include the time of the removal hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i); see p. 2, above. But Mr. Banuelos’s document did not tell him the date or time of the hearing, so the immigration court later sent him a notice of hearing with this information. Mr. Banuelos then sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge rejected each request, and Mr. Banuelos appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. While the administrative appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Pereira v. Sessions, which held that the stop-time rule is ...

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