FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 9 2020 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT BENJAMIN LIZARDI, No. 18-72576 Petitioner, Agency No. A205-530-611 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted November 19, 2020 San Francisco, California Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SCHROEDER and BERZON, Circuit Judges. Benjamin Lizardi, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We grant the Petition for Review. Because the parties are familiar with the history of this case, we need not recount it here. Substantial evidence does not support the agency’s denial of relief under the CAT. See Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating substantial evidence standard). To reverse the BIA’s factual finding, “the evidence must compel a different conclusion from the one reached by the BIA.” Xiao Fei Zheng v. Holder, 644 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2011). To obtain CAT relief, an applicant must show he is “more likely than not” to be tortured upon removal. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2009). The IJ and BIA must consider all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture . . . , including, but not limited to: (i) Evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant; (ii) Evidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the country of removal where he or she is not likely to be tortured; (iii) Evidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights within the country of removal, where applicable; and (iv) Other relevant information regarding conditions in the country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3). 2 The applicant does not have the “burden . . . to demonstrate that relocation within the proposed country of removal is impossible because the IJ must consider all relevant evidence; no one factor is determinative.” Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).1 The BIA must consider whether relocation would be safe and reasonable. Akosung v. Barr, 970 F.3d 1095, 1101- 02 (9th Cir. 2020); Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 364 (9th Cir. 2017). Both the IJ and the BIA found that Lizardi was not more likely than not to be tortured upon removal to Mexico. The BIA determined that, although Lizardi had been tortured in the past by the Chikiminiki gang, he had not established “a likelihood of torture outside of the local areas where he may be identifiable to Chikiminiki group members and their affiliates.” The BIA reasoned that Lizardi could thus relocate within Mexico. This conclusion is not supported by substantial ...
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