NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 21 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT BHUPINDER SINGH, No. 20-71412 Petitioner, Agency No. A200-891-205 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted October 12, 2021** Before: TALLMAN, RAWLINSON, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges. Bhupinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law, including the legal question of whether a particular social group is cognizable, except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing statutes and regulations. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241- 42 (9th Cir. 2020). We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Id. at 1241. We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review. The agency did not err in concluding that Singh failed to establish membership in a cognizable particular social group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (in order to demonstrate membership in a particular social group, “[t]he applicant must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question’” (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014))). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Singh failed to establish that the harm he experienced or fears was or would be on account of a political opinion. See Sagaydak v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005) (to establish a nexus to a political opinion ground, petitioner must show “(1) that [he] had either an affirmative or imputed political opinion, and (2) that [he was] targeted on account of that opinion.”). Singh’s contention that the agency failed to consider his claim of future 2 20-71412 persecution as a supporter of the Akali Dal Mann party fails. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (agency need not “write an exegesis on every contention”). Singh’s contentions that the BIA otherwise erred in failing to address his arguments as to an objective fear of future persecution fail. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required to decide issues unnecessary to the results they reach). We lack jurisdiction to consider Singh’s pattern or practice of persecution claims. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th …
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