NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 12 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT BLAS GARCIA-CISNEROS, No. 18-73080 Petitioner, Agency No. A078-069-237 v. MEMORANDUM* ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted February 10, 2021** San Francisco, California Before: HURWITZ and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and CORKER,*** District Judge. After Blas Garcia-Cisneros, a native and citizen of Mexico, was charged with removability, he gave the immigration court a mailing address and was released on * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Clifton L. Corker, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Tennessee, sitting by designation. bond pending a removal hearing. Garcia then moved without informing the court. He claims he did not receive two notices of his removal hearing date, one mailed before he moved, and the other after. Garcia failed to appear at the hearing and was ordered removed in absentia. Four years later, Garcia filed a motion to reopen, asserting lack of notice of the removal hearing, equitable tolling of the lapsed deadline to reopen, and changed country conditions. An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Garcia’s appeal. We deny Garcia’s petition for review in part and dismiss it in part. 1. A hearing notice is presumed received when “properly directed” to the alien’s last provided address. See Busquets-Ivars v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U.S. 185, 193 (1884)); Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 665, 673 (BIA 2008). Although “delivery by regular mail does not raise the same ‘strong presumption’ as certified mail,” the burden remains on the alien to rebut the presumption of receipt. Salta v. INS, 314 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2002). The IJ did not abuse his discretion in concluding that Garcia’s bare allegation of nonreceipt did not rebut the presumption. See Go v. Holder, 744 F.3d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting standard of review on motion to reopen). And, after Garcia moved without updating his address, he was no longer entitled to notice. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2)(B) (“[W]ritten notice shall not be required . . . if the alien has failed to provide the address required . . . .”); see also Velasquez-Escovar v. Holder, 2 768 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating that “aliens are entitled to notice unless they fail to give a current address to the government or fail to let the government know when they move”). 2. Garcia is not entitled to reopening because the IJ failed to warn him orally of the consequences of failing to appear when he was released on bond. Matter of M-S-, 22 ...
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