NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 14 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CARLOS LIBRADO PARRA-PEREZ, No. 20-70233 Petitioner, Agency No. A091-556-875 v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM* Respondent. On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the Department of Homeland Security Submitted June 10, 2021** Seattle, Washington Before: GILMAN,*** GOULD, and MILLER, Circuit Judges. Carlos Librado Parra-Perez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of an immigration judge’s (IJ’s) determination under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(g) that Parra-Perez did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in Mexico. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. Parra-Perez was thus found not entitled to relief from his reinstated removal order. We review an IJ’s reasonable-fear determination for substantial evidence, Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir. 2018), and we review questions of law de novo, Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 933 (9th Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Parra-Perez failed to establish a reasonable possibility of persecution on account of a protected ground. Contrary to Parra-Perez’s argument, those with perceived wealth do not constitute a cognizable social group. See Bartolome, 904 F.3d at 814; Ramirez- Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2016). And although “family remains the quintessential particular social group,” Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015), nothing in the record shows that the abuse experienced by Parra-Perez was motivated by his familial affiliations. The IJ erred, however, by utilizing the wrong legal standards regarding Parra-Perez’s Convention Against Torture (CAT) claim: first, by relying on a “rogue-officer exception” to CAT relief that this court has expressly rejected; and second, by incorrectly articulating the “reasonable possibility” standard. Those seeking protection under CAT must prove that future torture they would experience would be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18(a)(1), 1208.18(a)(1) (effective until January 11, 2021). The IJ 2 20-70233 disagreed with the asylum officer’s finding that this state-action requirement had been met, reasoning instead that this does appear to be rogue police officers, at best. And there is a recent case indicating that rogue police officers acting outside the scope of their employment is not necessarily a basis to conclude that that is government action for purposes of protection under the Convention against Torture . . . it’s O something or other. . . . I would not find that it is government action. Later, the IJ wrote that the “[e]vents were random crime by …
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