16-1487-ag Cesar v. Barr UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 17th day of October, two thousand nineteen. Present: AMALYA L. KEARSE, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ FRANTZ CESAR, Petitioner, v. 16-1487-ag WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ For Petitioner: EDMUND POLUBINSKI III (David B. Toscano and Matthew A. Weinberg, on the brief), Davis Polk & Wardwell, LLP, New York, NY For Respondent: JENNIFER A. BOWEN (Chad A. Readler, Joseph H. Hunt, Anthony C. Payne, Jessica D. Strokus, on the brief), Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Frantz Cesar was convicted under New York Penal Law (“NYPL”) § 260.10(1) for endangering the welfare of a child after he released his pit bull during an argument and told the dog to “sic [the child].” C.A.R. 486. Removal proceedings were initiated against him based on that conviction. Cesar now petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision that NYPL § 260.10(1) qualifies as a “crime of child abuse” as defined in § 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. Our recent holding in Matthews v. Barr, 927 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 2019), fully resolves this appeal. There, Matthews was convicted under NYPL § 260.10(1) for endangering the welfare of a child by “repeatedly expos[ing] himself in public while intoxicated.” Id. at 610–11. After the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, Matthews argued that NYPL § 260.10(1) was not categorically a “crime of child abuse, neglect, or abandonment” and thus could not serve as a predicate for his removal. Id. at 614. We rejected that argument and held that NYPL § 260.10(1) is a categorical match to the INA’s definition of a crime of child abuse, as interpreted by the BIA. Id. at 618–20. We further held that Matthews failed to demonstrate a realistic probability that NYPL § 260.10(1) is broader than the BIA’s definition. ...
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