Case: 18-12114 Date Filed: 12/17/2018 Page: 1 of 4 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________ No. 18-12114 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________ Agency No. A060-009-810 CHAD PARCHMENT-BERRY, Petitioner, versus U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. ________________________ Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ________________________ (December 17, 2018) Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and HULL, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Case: 18-12114 Date Filed: 12/17/2018 Page: 2 of 4 Chad Parchment-Berry, a native of Jamaica, appeals the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals upholding the Immigration Judge’s determination that he was removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Specifically, the IJ concluded that Parchment-Berry was removable for having committed a “crime of violence,” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), because of his Florida conviction for robbery with a weapon under Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1). 1 On appeal, Parchment-Berry argues that his robbery offense is not a “categorical match” to § 16(a) because it is “overbroad to the federal definition of a crime of violence.” Section 16 defines “crime of violence” as “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). 2 In determining whether a state conviction is a “crime of violence,” this Court “examine[s] what the state conviction necessarily involved, not the facts underlying the case” and “must 1 Florida’s robbery statute defines robbery as: the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1). 2 The Supreme Court recently held that the “residual clause” of the crime of violence definition found in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague. See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1216 (2018). 2 Case: 18-12114 Date Filed: 12/17/2018 Page: 3 of 4 presume that the conviction rested upon [nothing] more than the least of th[e] acts criminalized.” Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190–91 (2013) (quotations omitted). Parchment-Berry argues that the Florida robbery statute is not a crime of violence because it does not necessarily involve “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” Specifically, he points to the fact that one can be convicted for robbery in Florida not just for the “use of force, violence, [or] assault,” but also for “putting [another] in fear.” The problem with this contention, however, is what Parchment-Berry calls the “800 pound pink gorilla in the room”—namely, that we have already held that Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1) is a “crime of violence” in the context of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). See United States v. Seabrooks, 839 ...
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