[J-118-2019] [MO: Dougherty, J.] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 2 EAP 2019 : Appellee : Appeal from the Judgment of : Superior Court entered on : 8/28/2018 at No. 1028 EDA 2017 v. : affirming the Judgement of : Sentence entered on 2/2/2017 in the : Court of Common Pleas, BRAHIM SMITH, : Philadelphia County, Criminal : Division at No. CP-51-CR-0006922- Appellant : 2014. : SUBMITTED: December 12, 2019 DISSENTING OPINION JUSTICE WECHT DECIDED: July 21, 2020 I do not doubt that the existence of a bench warrant might, in appropriate circumstances, dovetail with a determination that an individual is a “fugitive from justice” prohibited from possessing a firearm under the Uniform Firearms Act. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(c)(1). But it cannot be gainsaid that “[a] man is not fleeing from justice until he knows that justice is looking for him or fears that justice is about to look for him.” Commonwealth v. Woong Knee New, 47 A.2d 450, 466 (Pa. 1946). At times, a warrant is executed to secure the arrest of a “fugitive from justice.” At others, a bench warrant may issue for reasons wholly unrelated to any fugitive status, and perhaps unrelated even to the commission of any crime in the first place. The fatal defect of the Commonwealth’s case against Brahim Smith is the absence of any evidence of record as to why the warrant was issued or whether Smith had notice of it. Because the record before us is utterly devoid of probative evidence supporting even an inference that Smith knew that a warrant had been issued for his arrest—and that he intended to flee from it—I cannot join the Court’s conclusion that he was a fugitive per se, and thus automatically precluded from possessing a firearm. Accordingly, I think it plain that this Court is bound to reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and vacate Smith’s misdemeanor conviction under subsection 6105(c)(1). The status of fugitives was a primary concern of our nation’s Founders. From the outset, the extradition of fugitives has been recognized as an obligation of comity between the States. See Innes v. Tobin, 240 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1916) (“[P]rior to the adoption of the Constitution fugitives from justice were surrendered between the states conformably to what were deemed to be the controlling principles of comity.”) (citing Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66, 101-02 (1860), overruled by Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987)). To that end, the phrase “fugitive from Justice” formally entered our constitutional lexicon in 1777 with the Second Continental Congress’ approval of the fourth article of our fledgling nation’s first Charter, which provided: The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from Justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states . . . . If any ...
Original document
Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals