NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________ No. 20-2503 _____________ D.G.M., Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ______________ On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A088-446-835) Immigration Judge: Walter A. Durling ____________ Argued December 13, 2022 Before: RESTREPO, McKEE, and SMITH, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: March 1, 2023) Melissa Syring [ARGUED] Monica L. Coscia Omid Nasab Anthony L. Ryan Cravath Swaine & Moore 825 Eighth Avenue Worldwide Plaza New York, NY 10019 Counsel for Petitioner Lindsay Marshall [ARGUED] United States Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation P.O. Box 848 Ben Franklin Station Washington, DC 20044 Counsel for Respondent ____________ OPINION ____________ McKEE, Circuit Judge: D.G.M. petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings in order to reapply for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Because the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen, we will deny the petition for review.1 I. The BIA denied D.G.M.’s motion to reopen because evidence he submitted to support his motion demonstrated only a continuation of the country conditions previously presented to the IJ, rather than a material change in these conditions. Where a motion to reopen is time-barred,2 an applicant must provide material evidence of changed conditions in the country to which deportation has been ordered that This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 1 Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002) (review of the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen is for abuse of discretion, which means reversal is only warranted if the BIA’s decision was “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”). 2 There is no dispute that D.G.M.’s motion to reopen is time-barred since he filed it more than 90 days after the order of removal became final. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). D.G.M. filed his motion to reopen on March 5, 2020, two and a half years after the BIA’s October 20, 2017, final administrative order. 2 “could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”3 To determine whether a petitioner has presented material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable, “we compare the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.”4 “The requirement to present material evidence is a ‘heavy burden’ [as the evidence must] rebut[] the IJ’s finding ‘that provided the basis’ for denying relief.”5 D.G.M. argues that the BIA failed to adequately consider—and/or ignored—the new evidence he presented which he contends proves a likelihood that he will be tortured, and that the Jamaican government will acquiesce in his torture if he is returned to Jamaica.6 To substantiate these claims, he points to “dramatic spikes in homicides”7 in Jamaica and increased corruption within the Jamaican government …
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