UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 20-1529 DAVID ORLANDO MARQUEZ CRUZ, a/k/a David Cruz, Petitioner, v. ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Submitted: January 29, 2021 Decided: March 3, 2021 Before WILKINSON, RICHARDSON, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges. Remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. Himedes V. Chicas, JEZIC & MOYSE, LLC, Silver Spring, Maryland; Benjamin R. Winograd, IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE APPELLATE CENTER, LLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for Petitioner. Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Jennifer J. Keeney, Assistant Director, Melissa K. Lott, Criminal Immigration Team, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: David Orlando Marquez Cruz, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions this Court for review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) finding him removable from the United States. We remand for further proceedings so that the BIA has the opportunity to address two questions: (1) whether Congress intended 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(E)(i) to apply to aliens convicted of an attempt or inchoate offense; and (2) whether a strict liability statute can satisfy the BIA’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). I. In 2009, Cruz was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident. In 2018, he pled guilty to attempted second-degree child sex abuse under Sections 22-3009 and -3018 of the D.C. Code and was convicted in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. After his release, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) detained Cruz and charged him with removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having been convicted of an aggravated felony, and under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) for having been convicted of a “crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment.” The Immigration Judge (IJ) found that his D.C. conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), but that it did qualify as a “crime of child abuse” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). Thus, the IJ sustained DHS’s charge of removability on that second ground. The IJ denied petitioner’s application for cancellation of removal as a matter of discretion. Cruz appealed to the BIA, challenging the IJ’s finding that his conviction qualified as a crime of child abuse and that he did not merit a discretionary grant of cancellation of 2 removal. The BIA dismissed the appeal in a single-member unpublished decision. In so doing, the BIA concluded that Cruz was removable based on his conviction for attempted second-degree child abuse under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). But in dismissing the appeal, the BIA did not address two important questions Cruz raises in his petition. First, Cruz argues the phrase “crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) applies only to completed offenses. Instead of addressing Cruz’s statutory interpretation position, the BIA primarily noted that Cruz failed to present any …
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