Davinder Singh v. Jefferson Sessions

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 22 2018 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DAVINDER SINGH, No. 15-70135 Petitioner, Agency No. A087-473-270 v. MEMORANDUM* JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted June 12, 2018 San Francisco, California Before: SILER,** PAEZ, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges. Davinder Singh petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the decision of an Immigration Judge (IJ) denying his * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. The agency’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence. First, the IJ provided “‘specific examples’ of [Singh’s] demeanor by making ‘explicit reference to particular unrecorded aspects of demeanor.’” Manes v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quoting Kin v. Holder, 595 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2010)). Because the IJ noted in her decision both the type of behavior involved as well as when it took place, the IJ’s finding that Singh’s demeanor undermined his credibility was supported by substantial evidence. See id. This, in turn, “sustains the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.” Ling Huang v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 2014). Second, the IJ found that Singh’s “testimony was fraught with inconsistencies,” and the record does not compel a contrary conclusion. Substantial evidence supports the finding that Singh provided inconsistent testimony regarding the identity of the person who made the arrangements for his travel to the United States, and the nature of his activities in the United States. Although on appeal Singh attempts to explain away these inconsistencies, “[i]t cannot be said . . . that the evidence compels the interpretation of the evidence 2 advocated by [Singh].” Lianhua Jiang v. Holder, 754 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2014). Finally, the IJ’s finding that portions of Singh’s testimony were inherently implausible was reasonably based on common sense determinations, and further supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The IJ referenced every piece of Singh’s nontestimonial evidence in the record and gave “specific, cogent reason[s]” for according it less weight. Lin v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The IJ could reasonably conclude that the value of the affidavit submitted by executive party member Rajinder Singh Fauji was reduced by the inconsistencies in Singh’s testimony about how well Fauji knew Singh or would be able to predict whether he would be persecuted if he returned to India. The IJ could also reasonably conclude that the value of the affidavits submitted by family members was reduced because ...

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Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals