Delio Corleto Martinez v. Merrick Garland


NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 26 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DELIO DE JESUS CORLETO- Nos. 17-73005 MARTINEZ, AKA Delio De Jesus Coleto- 18-72226 Martinez, AKA Delio Jesus Corletto, AKA 20-71296 Delio Jesus Corletto-Martinez, AKA Corletto Delio De Jesus, Agency No. A026-987-936 Petitioner, MEMORANDUM* v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted July 7, 2021** Seattle, Washington Before: CLIFTON and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and CALDWELL,*** District Judge. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Karen K. Caldwell, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation. Delio De Jesus Corleto-Martinez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of an immigration judge’s (IJ) decision and two orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in this consolidated case. Corleto first petitions for review of the IJ’s determination that he lacked a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in El Salvador and therefore is not entitled to relief from his reinstated removal order. Corleto also petitions for review of two decisions from the BIA denying motions to reopen his original deportation order. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny Corleto’s petitions. With respect to Corleto’s first petition, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Corleto failed to establish a reasonable fear of persecution in El Salvador on account of a protected ground. Corleto does not claim a fear of persecution on account of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinion; instead, his claim is based on his alleged membership in a particular social group. However, at most, the evidence in the record demonstrates that gangs in El Salvador targeted Corleto because he owned cows, and, thus, they perceived him to have money. These motivations do not give rise to a viable social group claim, as this Court has pointed out. See Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 814 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[G]angs did not target Bartolome based on a protected ground. Rather, the gangs targeted him because they perceived him to have money, which we have not recognized as a 2 cognizable social group.” (citing Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2016))). Corleto nevertheless argues that the IJ erred “by not recognizing that the persecution here was . . . based on [his] family business, which is the basis of a [particular social group] and a protected class.” The IJ, however, did not commit reversible error simply because he failed to interpret the evidence in the manner now advocated by Corleto. See Don v. Gonzalez, 476 F.3d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 2007). That is particularly true given that the underlying record contains little, if any, evidence …

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