Case: 17-15192 Date Filed: 04/26/2019 Page: 1 of 6 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________ No. 17-15192 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________ D.C. Docket Nos. 0:16-cv-61354-DMM; 0:08-cr-60090-DMM-2 DEVON CHANCE, Petitioner-Appellant, versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________ (April 26, 2019) Before WILLIAM PRYOR, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Case: 17-15192 Date Filed: 04/26/2019 Page: 2 of 6 Devon Chance appeals from the district court’s denial of his authorized successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. The district court granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on one issue: whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Because this question has been answered in the negative by this Court’s recent precedents, we affirm. A federal jury found Chance guilty of six counts of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); six counts of possession of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (predicated on the Hobbs Act robbery offenses), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); and one count of conspiracy to possess a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (predicated on the conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery offense), 18 U.S.C. § 924(o). The district court sentenced Chance to a total of 1,794 months’ imprisonment, 60 months’ supervised release, and fines totaling $1400. Chance’s convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, United States v. Lewis, 433 F. App’x 844 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished), and the district court subsequently denied his first § 2255 motion. In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that the definition of “violent felony” in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) of the Armed Career Criminal Act—commonly called the 2 Case: 17-15192 Date Filed: 04/26/2019 Page: 3 of 6 “residual clause”—was unconstitutionally vague. 135 S. Ct. at 2557. The Supreme Court later held that Johnson announced a new substantive rule that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264-65, 1268 (2016). More recently, in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), the Court extended Johnson to invalidate the residual- clause definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act. Relying on Johnson and Welch, Chance filed an application for leave to file a second or successive § 2255 motion on the ground that the definition of “crime of violence” in § 924(c)(3)’s residual clause1 had the same constitutional failings as the ACCA’s residual clause, and that all seven of his convictions under §§ 924(c)(1) and 924(o) were therefore invalid. We granted Chance leave to file a second § 2255 motion on the limited issue of whether his conviction for conspiracy to possess a firearm during and in relation ...
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