Deyvi De Leon v. Attorney General United States


NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________ No. 20-2381 _______________ DEYVI ALEXANDER DE LEON, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA _______________ On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A214-261-311) Immigration Judge: Jason L. Pope _______________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a): March 16, 2021 _______________ Before: SHWARTZ, PORTER, and MATEY, Circuit Judges. (Filed: March 19, 2021) ______________ OPINION ______________  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. PORTER, Circuit Judge. Deyvi Alexander De Leon petitions for review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA’s order (1) upheld a decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying De Leon’s application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b and (2) denied De Leon’s motion to remand. We will deny De Leon’s petition for review. We write for the parties, who are familiar with the record. I1 Section 1229b(b)(1)(D) provides that an otherwise deportable alien may obtain cancellation of removal if he, among other conditions, “establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” The BIA affirmed the IJ’s finding that De Leon’s child, mother, and father would not suffer “extremely unusual hardship” because of his removal, thus precluding cancellation of removal. “We lack jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions made pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, including ‘exceptional and extremely unusual’ hardship determinations.” Patel v. Att’y Gen., 619 F.3d 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)). Instead, “[o]ur jurisdiction . . . is ‘narrowly circumscribed’ . . . to ‘colorable claims or 1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Where, as here, “the ‘BIA’s opinion directly states that the BIA is deferring to the IJ, or invokes specific aspects of the IJ’s analysis and factfinding in support of the BIA’s conclusions,’ we review both decisions.” Uddin v. Att’y Gen., 870 F.3d 282, 289 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Oliva-Ramos v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 259, 270 (3d Cir. 2012)). 2 questions of law.’” Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Cospito v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2008)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). A claim is not colorable if “it is immaterial and made solely for the pur- pose of obtaining jurisdiction or is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” Pareja, 615 F.3d at 186 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 n.10 (2006)). We review questions of law de novo. Serrano-Alberto v. Att’y Gen., 859 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2017). As described in Part II, De Leon argues that the IJ violated his statutory, regula- tory, and Fifth Amendment procedural due-process rights during the cancellation-of- removal proceeding. In removal proceedings, “the alien shall have …

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