Diaz Carranza v. Garland


20-1123 Diaz Carranza v. Garland BIA Nelson, IJ A087 780 822/823 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 6th day of July, two thousand twenty-one. PRESENT: SUSAN L. CARNEY, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, JOSEPH F. BIANCO, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ AURA M. DIAZ CARRANZA, JOSE ANTONIO CARRANZA, Petitioners, v. No. 20-1123 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONERS: H. Raymond Fasano, Youman, Madeo & Fasano, LLP, New York, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: John F. Stanton, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation (Maarja T. Luhtaru, Acting Senior Litigation Counsel, on the brief), for Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DISMISSED. Petitioners Aura M. Diaz Carranza and Jose Antonio Carranza, natives and citizens of Guatemala, seek review of a 2020 decision of the BIA affirming a 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied their applications for cancellation of removal. In re Aura M. Diaz Carranza, Jose Antonio Carranza, No. A 087 780 822/823 (B.I.A. Mar. 2, 2020), aff’g No. A 087 780 822/823 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. May 4, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history and refer to them only as necessary to explain our decision to dismiss. We have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Where the BIA adopts the decision of the IJ and merely supplements the IJ’s decision, . . . we review the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA.”). Nonpermanent residents like Petitioners may obtain cancellation of removal if they meet statutory presence and character requirements and “establish[] that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [their] spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). To qualify as an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” under the statute, the hardship to a qualifying relative “must be substantially beyond the ordinary hardship that would be expected when a close family member leaves this …

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