Direct Capital Corporation v. Brooks CA3


Filed 2/2/21 Direct Capital Corporation v. Brooks CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (San Joaquin) ---- DIRECT CAPITAL CORPORATION, C089980 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. STK-CV- UBC-2014-0006707) v. MARY BROOKS, Defendant; GRANT L.C. BROOKS, Appellant. This is the second appeal filed by defendant Grant Brooks (Grant) after the trial court issued a wage garnishment order for a debt incurred by his then spouse (Mary 1 Brooks, with many aliases, hereafter Mary).1 In the first appeal, we affirmed the garnishment order, upholding the trial court’s finding that a debt incurred by Grant’s attorney-spouse for office computer equipment was for the “necessaries of life” for that particular marriage within the meaning of Family Code section 9142 because the spouse’s law practice generated community property income. (Direct Capital Corp. v. Brooks (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1168, 1170 (Direct Capital).) The garnishment order was affirmed without prejudice to a motion in the trial court to vacate or modify it based on the terms of a divorce judgment entered after the notice of appeal was filed. (Id. at pp. 1170, 1178.) In this appeal, Grant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate/set aside the garnishment order. We requested supplemental briefing to address whether Grant’s motion is predicated on an erroneous interpretation of section 916, a question that was neither raised nor resolved in the trial court, and not addressed by either party in the initial briefing on appeal. As we will explain, we conclude that the answer to this question is “yes”; accordingly, Grant’s motion fails on its merits and we affirm. BACKGROUND Garnishment Order and Divorce Judgment The following is taken from the prior opinion we issued in this case. (Direct Capital, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th 1168.)3 1 Because Mary and Grant shared the same surname at all relevant times related to the issuance of the garnishment order, we refer to each by their first name in order to avoid confusion. 2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code. 3 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of our prior opinion. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) 2 In 2013 plaintiff Direct Capital Corporation (DCC) leased computer equipment to Mary, a since-disbarred Kansas attorney, who practiced immigration law in Stockton. (Direct Capital, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 1171.) After Mary did not pay, DCC sued her and obtained a judgment for nearly $40,000. (Ibid.) DCC later moved to garnish the wages of her attorney husband, Grant. (Ibid.) DCC alleged that when the debt was incurred, the marriage was intact, and the judgment thereon (grown to over $43,000 with interest) was a community obligation. (Ibid.) After a hearing, the trial court issued a ...

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