NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 9 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DYLAN J. WHITEHEAD, No. 19-35586 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:18-cv-05542-BAT v. MEMORANDUM* ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Brian Tsuchida, Magistrate Judge, Presiding Submitted October 5, 2020** Seattle, Washington * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1 Before: GRABER and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and FREUDENTHAL,*** District Judge Dylan J. Whitehead appeals the district court’s decision affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Whitehead’s applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 1. Whitehead contends that the ALJ afforded very little weight to medical-psychological assessments prior to the alleged disability onset date. The bare assertion that the evidence “provides a longitudinal perspective on Whitehead’s mental impairments,” does not satisfy the burden to show error, particularly considering this evidence’s limited relevance. See Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Medical opinions that predate the alleged onset of disability are of limited relevance.”). 2. Whitehead complains that the ALJ discounted certain opinions from five examining psychologists that were contradicted by other medical evidence and evaluator assessments. In this situation, the ALJ must offer “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record” for rejecting a contradicted opinion. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830–31 (9th Cir. ** The Honorable Nancy D. Freudenthal, United States District Judge for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation. 2 1995); see Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (stating the substantial evidence standard).1 For the reasons that follow, the ALJ has satisfied this standard. In discounting Dr. Thompson’s opinion of marked limitation in Whitehead’s ability to respond appropriately to usual work situations, the ALJ noted the lack of any opinion that this or other limitations would preclude all work activities. The remaining four contradicted opinions from Drs. Wingate, Truschel, Meagher, and Kenderdine were discounted in part because the severity of symptoms reported by those examiners was inconsistent with Whitehead’s lack of effort to seek and continue prescribed therapy. Whitehead argues that this reason is not legitimate because his lack of treatment is explained by poor judgment caused by mental illness. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1018 n.24 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is a questionable practice to chastise one with a mental impairment for the exercise of poor judgment in seeking 1 The government’s repeated citation to INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992), is inapposite. The “substantial evidence” standard employed in Elias- Zacarias is specific to this court’s review of final orders of removal. See 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(4)(B) ...
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