FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT EDUARDO J. ENRIQUEZ, AKA No. 13-72934 Eduardo Jobanny Enriquez, Petitioner, Agency No. A095-465-235 v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, OPINION Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submission Deferred April 3, 2020 Submitted August 6, 2020 * Pasadena, California Filed August 13, 2020 Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Mary H. Murguia, and Eric D. Miller, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam Opinion; Concurrence by Judge Murguia * The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 2 ENRIQUEZ V. BARR SUMMARY ** Immigration Denying Eduardo Enriquez’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the panel held that Enriquez was not “admitted” within the meaning of the cancellation of removal statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2), when he was approved as a derivative beneficiary of his mother’s self-petition under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). In 2000, Enriquez’s mother self-petitioned under VAWA, filing a Form I-360 Petition for Special Immigrant and listing Enriquez as her dependent child. The petition was approved the same year, and Enriquez was granted deferred action and later received work authorization. In 2008, Enriquez adjusted to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status. After a conviction in 2012, Enriquez was charged as removable for having committed a crime involving moral turpitude within five years of admission. He conceded removability, an immigration judge denied his application for cancellation of removal, and the BIA affirmed. For cancellation of removal, as relevant here, a lawful permanent resident must have “resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2). The panel explained that Enriquez’s period of continuous residence stopped accruing ** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. ENRIQUEZ V. BARR 3 when he committed a crime of moral turpitude in 2012, and therefore, to meet the seven-year residence requirement, he had to show he was “admitted in any status” in 2005 or earlier. The panel explained that the court generally defines “admitted” by reference to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)’s statutory definition, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A), which requires “lawful entry . . . after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” However, the panel noted that the court has embraced an alternative construction of the term when the statutory context dictates, and that the BIA has recognized that “compelling reasons” may justify a deviation from the statutory definition. The panel further explained that, in Medina-Nunez v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam), the court deferred to a BIA decision concluding that participation in the Family Unity Program does not constitute an admission for purposes of cancellation of removal. In Medina-Nunez, as the panel observed, the court also narrowed the definition of “admitted” under § 1229b(a)(2), absent “compelling reasons,” to the INA’s ...
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