NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 7 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT EDUIN RENE MIRAMONTES, No. 19-70433 Petitioner, Agency No. A095-681-973 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted November 20, 2020** San Francisco, California Before: NGUYEN, HURWITZ, and BRESS, Circuit Judges. Eduin Rene Miramontes-Hernandez, a native and citizen of Mexico, applied for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) and a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied both applications, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Miramontes- * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Hernandez’s subsequent appeal. Miramontes-Hernandez now petitions for review. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. 1. Miramontes-Hernandez argues that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction over his removal proceedings because his Notice to Appear (“NTA”) failed to designate the court where the NTA would be filed, in violation of 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.14(a) and 1003.15(b)(6). This argument is foreclosed by Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, which held that such a failure does not strip the immigration court of jurisdiction if a subsequent hearing notice provides the missing information. 958 F.3d 887, 894–95, 895 n.4 (9th Cir. 2020). Here, although the original NTA did not designate the immigration court, this error was cured by subsequent hearing notices. 2. Miramontes-Hernandez next argues that the BIA violated its duty of impartiality in Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. 441 (BIA 2018), when it held that the immigration court could remedy a NTA that lacked information required by regulation. This argument is foreclosed by Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2019). In Karingithi, we found that Bermudez-Cota “reflect[ed] the agency’s fair and considered judgment.” 913 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Lezama-Garcia v. Holder, 666 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 2011)). 3. Finally, Miramontes-Hernandez argues that the phrase “violent or dangerous crimes” in 8 C.F.R. § 1212.7(d) is unconstitutionally vague under Sessions v. 2 Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). But Dimaya’s reasoning does not apply to § 1212.7(d). Dimaya held that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)1 was unconstitutionally vague. 138 S. Ct. at 1216. Section 16(b) defines a “crime of violence” as “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court held that two features of §16(b) combined to create “‘hopeless indeterminacy,’ inconsistent with due process.” Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1213 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 598 (2015)). First, the clause “calls for a court ...
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