Edwin Rivera-Ramirez v. Merrick Garland


NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 30 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT EDWIN RIVERA-RAMIREZ, No. 20-72941 Petitioner, Agency No. A206-636-506 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted February 23, 2023 San Francisco, California Before: BERZON, R. NELSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges. Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge BERZON. Petitioner Edwin Rivera-Ramirez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of his appeal of an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. We review for substantial evidence the factual findings underlying the BIA’s determination that a petitioner is not eligible for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT protection. Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2021). Under this standard, the BIA’s findings of fact are conclusive unless the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion but compels it. Id. 1. Rivera-Ramirez argues that the BIA erred in holding that he failed to demonstrate past persecution.1 He claims that his past treatment at the hands of gang members and a customer of a store at which he worked—especially the gang’s threats to his life if he did not smuggle marijuana into prison and his attempts to comply with their demands—amount to persecution and that the BIA’s contrary conclusion violated this court’s precedent. Persecution is an “extreme concept,” and “does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “This means that some circumstances that cause petitioners physical discomfort or loss of liberty do not qualify as persecution, despite the fact 1 Rivera-Ramirez does not challenge the BIA’s holding that, absent past persecution, he failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future prosecution, so we do not consider that issue here. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1152, 1157 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Issues not raised in an appellant’s opening brief are typically deemed waived.”). 2 that such conditions have caused the petitioners some harm.”2 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Significant considerations that inform the analysis include “whether the petitioner was subject to significant physical violence,” “whether he suffered serious injuries that required medical treatment,” and whether the “harm was an isolated incident, or, conversely, part of an ongoing pattern of serious maltreatment.” Id. at 1061 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Threats are also considered. While we “have been most likely to find persecution where threats are repeated, specific and combined with confrontation or other mistreatment,” id. at 1062 (citation omitted), “most threats do not rise to the level of persecution,” Nahrvani v. Gonzales, …

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