NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ______________ No. 19-3178 ______________ ELMER CRISTOBAL PEREZ-COBON a/k/a Elmer Cobo, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ______________ On Petition for Review of a Decision and Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA-1: A215-589-875) Immigration Judge: Honorable Kuyomars Q. Golparvar ______________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) May 27, 2020 Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. (Opinion Filed: June 8, 2020) ____________ OPINION* ____________ * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. Elmer Perez-Cobon petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals. The BIA dismissed Perez-Cobon’s appeal from the decision of the Immigration Judge finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). We will deny the petition for review. I A Guatemalan citizen, Perez-Cobon was admitted into the United States on an H-2 visa in 1997. He overstayed his visa, and the Department of Homeland Security placed him in removal proceedings in 2018. He conceded his removability and sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). The IJ found Perez-Cobon ineligible for cancellation of removal because he was convicted of a CIMT (criminal impersonation in Delaware in violation of 11 Del. C. § 907(1)). The IJ ordered Perez-Cobon removed, and he appealed to the BIA. There, Perez-Cobon argued he had not been convicted of criminal impersonation and the IJ acted “hastily,” preventing counsel from reviewing court records detailing Perez-Cobon’s conviction. He also argued that even if he had been convicted, criminal impersonation under Section 907 is not a CIMT. The BIA concluded that the Delaware criminal impersonation offense is a CIMT and affirmed the IJ’s decision. II We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). “Where, as here, the BIA issues a written decision on the merits, we review its decision and not the decision of the IJ.” Baptiste v. Att’y Gen., 841 F.3d 601, 605 (3d 2 Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because the BIA’s determination was made in “an unpublished, non-precedential decision issued by a single BIA member, we do not accord that determination any deference.” Id. at 606. “At most, [such] decisions are persuasive authority.” Mahn v. Att’y Gen., 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014). III The Government claims Section 907 is a divisible statute. Before the BIA, Perez- Cobon agreed, writing in his brief that Section 907 “is clearly a divisible statute.” App. 452. We agree. A statute is divisible if it “lists multiple elements disjunctively,” instead of “various factual means of committing a single element.” United States v. Henderson, 841 F.3d 623, 628 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016)). In other words, a statute is divisible if it describes “multiple crimes.” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249. We determine whether ...
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