United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 20-3268 ___________________________ Emmanuel Deng Chol Petitioner v. Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General of the United States Respondent ____________ Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals ____________ Submitted: November 17, 2021 Filed: February 16, 2022 ____________ Before BENTON, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges. ____________ BENTON, Circuit Judge. Emmanuel Deng Chol—a citizen of South Sudan through his father—was born in a refugee camp in Uganda. At age five, he was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident. Twelve years later, he was convicted of two counts of robbery and sentenced to 7 to 15 years. Deng Chol was charged with removability. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (an alien convicted of an aggravated felony shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be removed); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (a theft offense with at least a one-year term of imprisonment is an aggravated felony). Deng Chol applied for asylum and requested withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). At his removal hearings, Deng Chol appeared pro se. The immigration judge (IJ) explained that he was ineligible for asylum due to his criminal record, but alerted him that he would be eligible for relief under the CAT if he could prove that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by the government (or with its acquiescence) in South Sudan and Uganda. After testimony from Deng Chol, his mother, and a prison official, the IJ determined he was not entitled to CAT relief and ordered removal to South Sudan or Uganda. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal, designating South Sudan as the country of removal with Uganda as an alternate. Deng Chol challenges the factual determination that it is not more likely than not that he would be tortured in South Sudan and Uganda. He also argues that the IJ erred procedurally by failing to (1) fully develop the record about his tribal faction, (2) provide the State Department’s country reports for South Sudan and Uganda, and (3) tell him the definition of “torture” under the CAT. Having jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4), this court denies the petition for review. I. Deng Chol challenges the IJ’s factual finding that it is not more likely than not that he would be tortured in South Sudan and Uganda. While this court’s jurisdiction over final orders of removal is typically limited to constitutional claims and questions of law, this court may review factual challenges to a CAT order. Gilbertson v. Garland, 7 F.4th 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2021), citing Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1694 (2020). The standard of review is substantial evidence. Lasu v. Barr, 970 F.3d 960, 964 (8th Cir. 2020), citing Nasrallah, 140 S. Ct. at 1692. Under this “extremely deferential” standard, “this court will not reverse the agency’s decision unless the petitioner demonstrates that the evidence was so compelling that -2- no reasonable fact …
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