NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 20a0153n.06 Nos. 19-3289/19-3745 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ESMERALDA RAMIREZ-GUZMAN, ) FILED Mar 13, 2020 ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk Petitioner, ) ) v. ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM ) THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, ) APPEALS ) Respondent. ) BEFORE: DAUGHTREY, KETHLEDGE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges. MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Esmeralda Ramirez- Guzman, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying her motions for remand and for reconsideration following the BIA’s affirmance of an immigration judge’s order of removal. Ramirez-Guzman contends that the BIA erred in concluding that her request for cancellation of removal failed to offer sufficient evidence both of her continuous presence in the United States and of the extreme hardship her two children (who are citizens of the United States) would suffer if she were removed to Mexico. Binding circuit precedent requires us to conclude that Ramirez-Guzman cannot establish her required continuous physical presence in the United States. Consequently, we must deny her petition for review. Neither Ramirez-Guzman nor the government seriously contest certain facts in this matter. First, the government does not dispute that Ramirez-Guzman, while she was a child in Mexico, Nos. 19-3289/19-3745, Ramirez-Guzman v. Barr suffered horrendous abuse at the hands of her stepfather. Nor does the government challenge the petitioner’s claim that Ramirez-Guzman’s former partner, Alejandro Ibarra, brutally abused her, both physically and sexually, on a regular basis while the couple lived in Mexico. Second, neither party contends that the administrative denials of asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture are being contested at this stage of the litigation. Instead, the only issues presently before us involve Ramirez-Guzman’s insistence that the BIA erred in denying her motion to remand in order to apply for cancellation of removal and her motion to reconsider that denial. We review a BIA denial of a motion to remand or a motion to reconsider under the abuse- of-discretion standard. Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 948 (6th Cir. 2004) (motion to remand); Fisenko v. Lynch, 826 F.3d 287, 290 (6th Cir. 2016) (motion to reconsider). “In determining whether the Board abused its discretion, this Court must decide whether the denial of Petitioner’s motion . . . was made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination against a particular race or group.” Balani v. INS, 669 F.2d 1157, 1161 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). Because “[m]otions to remand or to reopen are generally treated the same,” Ahmed v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 579, 585 n.7 (6th Cir. 2008), in order to succeed on her request for a remand to the BIA, Ramirez-Guzman must offer “new facts” that are “supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B) (setting forth the required contents of a motion to reopen). To establish her eligibility ...
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Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals