(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2019 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus ESPINOZA ET AL. v. MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MONTANA No. 18–1195. Argued January 22, 2020—Decided June 30, 2020 The Montana Legislature established a program that grants tax credits to those who donate to organizations that award scholarships for pri- vate school tuition. To reconcile the program with a provision of the Montana Constitution that bars government aid to any school “con- trolled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination,” Art. X, §6(1), the Montana Department of Revenue promulgated “Rule 1,” which prohibited families from using the scholarships at religious schools. Three mothers who were blocked by Rule 1 from using schol- arship funds for their children’s tuition at Stillwater Christian School sued the Department in state court, alleging that the Rule discrimi- nated on the basis of their religious views and the religious nature of the school they had chosen. The trial court enjoined Rule 1. Reversing, the Montana Supreme Court held that the program, unmodified by Rule 1, aided religious schools in violation of the Montana Constitu- tion’s no-aid provision. The Court further held that the violation re- quired invalidating the entire program. Held: The application of the no-aid provision discriminated against reli- gious schools and the families whose children attend or hope to attend them in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the Federal Constitu- tion. Pp. 6–22. (a) The Free Exercise Clause “protects religious observers against unequal treatment” and against “laws that impose special disabilities on the basis of religious status.” Trinity Lutheran Church of Colum- bia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. ___, ___. In Trinity Lutheran, this Court held that disqualifying otherwise eligible recipients from a public ben- efit “solely because of their religious character” imposes “a penalty on the free exercise of religion that triggers the most exacting scrutiny.” 2 ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE Syllabus Id., at ___. Here, the application of Montana’s no-aid provision ex- cludes religious schools from public benefits solely because of religious status. As a result, strict scrutiny applies. Pp. 6–12. (b) Contrary to the Department’s contention, this case is not gov- erned by Locke v. Davey, 540 U. S. 712. The plaintiff in Locke was denied a scholarship “because of what he proposed to do—use the funds to prepare for the ministry,” an essentially religious endeavor. Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___. By contrast, Montana’s no-aid pro- vision does not zero in on any essentially religious course of instruction but rather bars ...
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