PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 21-1177 EVENS JULMICE, Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Argued: January 27, 2022 Decided: March 23, 2022 Before RICHARDSON, RUSHING, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges. Petition granted; vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Heytens wrote the opinion, in which Judge Richardson and Judge Rushing joined. ARGUED: Jennifer Sheethel Varughese, ROTH JACKSON GIBBONS CONDLIN, PLC, McLean, Virginia, for Petitioner. Spencer Stephen Shucard, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Keith I. McManus, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. TOBY HEYTENS, Circuit Judge: A federal statute gives the Attorney General discretion to grant waiver of removal to a person who “is the . . . son[ ] or daughter of a citizen of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H)(i)(I). The Board of Immigration Appeals concluded petitioner Evens Julmice is categorically ineligible under that provision because his U.S. citizen father is no longer living. But the statutory text includes no living-parent requirement, so we grant the petition for review, vacate the Board’s decision, and remand for the agency to determine whether, as a matter of discretion, Julmice should receive a waiver. I. Congress allocates a certain number of immigrant visas per year for “the unmarried sons or daughters of citizens of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1). Julmice applied for and received one of those visas while his U.S. citizen father was still living. But Julmice was ineligible for such a visa because he had been married for five years when he applied for it. And misrepresenting his marital status, in turn, rendered Julmice removable from the United States. See §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), 1227(a)(1)(A). The Attorney General, however, has discretion to waive removal “for any alien . . . who . . . is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or of an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H)(i)(I). Julmice requested such a waiver, but an immigration judge concluded he was ineligible for one. Noting that Julmice’s father was deceased, the immigration judge followed Matter of Federiso, 24 I. & N. Dec. 661, 664 (B.I.A. 2008), a 2 precedential Board decision concluding that a deceased parent is not a qualifying relative for waiver eligibility. Julmice appealed to the Board, noting that the Ninth Circuit had already rejected Federiso’s living-parent requirement as contrary to the statutory text. See Federiso v. Holder, 605 F.3d 695 (9th Cir. 2010). Without engaging with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, the Board declined to revisit Federiso and adopted and affirmed the immigration judge’s decision holding Julmice ineligible. II. This case raises a discrete question of statutory interpretation: To be eligible for a Section 1227(a)(1)(H)(i) waiver, must a person be the son or daughter of a currently living …
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