NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 20 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT FELICIA AKUA AWUDZA, No. 17-72772 Petitioner, Agency No. A208-924-268 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted June 11, 2020 Pasadena, California Before: BEA and BADE, Circuit Judges, and GONZALEZ ROGERS,** District Judge. Felicia Akua Awudza, a native and citizen of Ghana, petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her application for withholding of removal, asylum, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. We review the agency’s “legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence.” Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citations omitted). “A finding by the IJ is not supported by substantial evidence when ‘any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary based on the evidence in the record.’” Id. (quoting Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 1. Awudza argues that the BIA abused its discretion by “summarily denying” her motion to reopen. See Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen and remand for abuse of discretion.”). On its face, however, the purported motion bears none of the indices of a motion to reopen: it neither “state[s] the new facts that will be proven at a hearing,” nor is it “supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (B)); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c), 1003.23(b)(3). Instead, it is most reasonably construed as a notice of appeal of the IJ’s decision. Moreover, even if that document might plausibly be construed as a motion to reopen, Awudza expressly withdrew it—through counsel—shortly after it was filed. Therefore, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by failing to rule on a purported motion to reopen. 2 Similarly, we find no error in the IJ’s failure to construe her submission of new country conditions evidence as a motion to reopen because, as Awudza acknowledges, she was represented by counsel at the time she submitted that evidence. Accordingly, she offers no basis for the agency to afford her the same liberal construction afforded to pro se litigants. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 676 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004). 2. Awudza next argues that the BIA erred by rejecting her contention that the IJ improperly concluded ...
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