NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 23 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT FIDEL PIEDRA-ALVAREZ, AKA Fidel No. 18-71943 Alvarez, Agency No. A038-526-953 Petitioner, v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted November 18, 2020** Phoenix, Arizona Before: BYBEE, MURGUIA, and BADE, Circuit Judges. Fidel Piedra-Alvarez, a citizen and resident of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) decision affirming the denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings under former section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). we do not recite them here. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), and we deny the petition. The BIA properly dismissed Piedra-Alvarez’s appeal. Under INS v. St. Cyr, relief under former section 212(c) “remains available for aliens . . . whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for § 212(c) relief at the time of their plea under the law then in effect.” 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001). The Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) set a deadline of April 26, 2005 for eligible lawful permanent residents (“LPRs”) to file special motions to reopen pursuant to St. Cyr. Section 212(c) Relief for Aliens with Certain Criminal Convictions Before April 1, 1997, 69 Fed. Reg. 57,826, 57,834 (Sept. 28, 2004) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.44(h)). Piedra-Alvarez contends that although he missed the deadline to seek relief under former section 212(c), the deadline itself is invalid—both because the deadline is arbitrary and because the rule establishing the deadline did not provide him constitutionally sufficient notice. Both arguments are foreclosed by our holding in Luna v. Holder, 659 F.3d 753, 759–60 (9th Cir. 2011). In Luna, we held that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.44(h) is “a constitutionally-sound procedural rule.” Id. at 755. When determining whether an agency decision is arbitrary or capricious, we examine whether the agency provided “a reasoned 2 explanation for its action,” which is “not a high bar.” Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 45 (2011). Because the EOIR gave an explanation for the deadline when promulgating the rule—the need to provide both the opportunity for LPRs to apply for relief, as required by St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326, and “finality” in LPRs’ immigration proceedings—the agency acted lawfully in establishing the deadline. See Section 212(c) Relief for Aliens with Certain Criminal Convictions Before April 1, 1997, 67 Fed. Reg. 52,627, 52,628 (Aug. 13, 2002). To the extent that the deadline was arbitrary, all deadlines are arbitrary. See United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 249 (1985) (“Deadlines are inherently arbitrary; fixed dates, ...
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