NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________ No. 18-2301 ____________ FRANCISCO BARILLAS; BLANCA AMANDA BARILLAS, Petitioners v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent ____________ On Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA-1: A070-582-696 & A070-582-697) ____________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) April 2, 2019 Before: CHAGARES, HARDIMAN, and SILER, JR. * Circuit Judges. (Filed: April 11, 2019) * Honorable Eugene Edward Siler, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. ____________ OPINION ** ____________ HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. Francisco and Blanca Amanda Barillas seek review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying their untimely and number-barred motion to reopen. Because the Barillas did not establish materially changed conditions in their home country of Guatemala, we will deny their petition. We have jurisdiction to consider this petition for review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). See Fei Yan Zhu v. Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 2014). Motions to reopen are disfavored and will be “granted only under compelling circumstances.” Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2004), as amended (Dec. 3, 2004). Petitioners may file only one motion to reopen, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), and they must do so “within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” Id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). Those time and number requirements do not apply, however, if petitioners can show materially changed circumstances in their country of nationality and prima facie eligibility for relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007). In their petition, the Barillas make only one argument about materially changed circumstances in Guatemala. They contend that the BIA failed to define a “material” ** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 2 change in country conditions under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). And they criticize the BIA for offering “no legal standard” for “what constitutes a sufficient change in country conditions or a meaningful comparison between those conditions.” Barillas Br. 11–12; see Reply Br. 3–5. The upshot is that the BIA violated their procedural due process rights. We disagree. To satisfy due process, the BIA need only show that it made an “individualized determination” about the Barillas’ case. Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 550 (3d Cir. 2001)). In Kamara, we upheld a BIA decision when the Board described the petition for relief, procedural posture of the case, relevant statutes and regulations, and basis for the immigration judge’s decision. See id. at 212. The same is true here. The BIA detailed the Barillas’ claim that Guatemalan gangs and drug cartels have become more dangerous. It outlined the case’s procedural history. It cited the statutes and regulations governing changes in country conditions (and motions to reopen more ...
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