United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 19-1286 ___________________________ Fredis Artola, also known as Jose Walter Merlos Giron Petitioner v. Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General of the United States Respondent ____________ Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals ____________ Submitted: December 17, 2020 Filed: May 5, 2021 ____________ Before GRUENDER, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. ____________ GRUENDER, Circuit Judge. Fredis Artola petitions us to review the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision denying his request for cancellation of removal. Artola argues that his grant of Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) obviates the need for him to demonstrate he was “admitted” in order to be eligible for cancellation of removal. Alternatively, he argues that his grant of TPS is an “admission” for cancellation-of- removal purposes. We disagree with both contentions, so we deny Artola’s petition. I. Artola, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in 1998 without inspection. On March 25, 2003, he received TPS. In May 2008, he gained lawful-permanent-resident status. On April 6, 2012, Minnesota police found cocaine in Artola’s possession, and he was subsequently convicted of drug possession under Minnesota law. In February 2018, Artola left the United States for a trip. When he returned, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security learned of Artola’s cocaine conviction, deferred Artola’s inspection, and ultimately sought his removal from the country. Before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), Artola applied for cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). Under § 1229b(a), an immigrant’s removal may be cancelled if he has (i) been lawfully admitted for permanent residency for at least five years, (ii) resided in the United States continuously for seven years after having been admitted in any status, and (iii) not been convicted of an aggravated felony. The IJ denied Artola’s request, concluding that Artola failed the second condition because he did not meet the seven-year-residency requirement. Artola appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ’s decision and reasoning. Artola petitions for our review. II. We review an agency’s legal determinations de novo. Llapa-Sinchi v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 897, 899 (8th Cir. 2008).1 Where, as here, the BIA issues a separate opinion rather than summarily affirming the IJ’s decision, we review the 1 The Government urges us to give the IJ’s and BIA’s statutory interpretations deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). But Skidmore deference applies only when the statute is ambiguous. See Mansour v. Holder, 739 F.3d 412, 415 (8th Cir. 2014). Because the statutory provisions at issue here are clear, “it [is] unnecessary to rely upon [the] agency view.” See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 326 (2008). -2- BIA’s decision as the final agency action. See Alzawed v. Barr, 970 F.3d 997, 1000 (8th Cir. 2020). To the extent the BIA adopted the IJ’s reasoning, we review the IJ’s decision too. Id. This case presents a narrow question of statutory interpretation, which is an issue of first impression …
Original document
Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals