Gao v. Garland


19-522 Gao v. Garland BIA Douchy, IJ A200 770 921 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 2nd day of April, two thousand twenty-one. PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, ROBERT A. KATZMANN, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ LI JUN GAO, Petitioner, v. 19-522 NAC MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.1 _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER: Jed S. Wasserman, Law Office of Ng & Wasserman, New York, NY. 1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Merrick B. Garland is automatically substituted as Respondent. FOR RESPONDENT: Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director; Russell J.E. Verby, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, for Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Washington, DC. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioner Li Jun Gao, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a February 7, 2019, decision of the BIA affirming a November 17, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), denying Gao’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Li Gao, No. A 200 770 921 (B.I.A. Feb. 7, 2019), aff’g No. A 200 770 921 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 17, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions for the sake of completeness. See Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014) (reviewing factual findings for substantial evidence and questions of law de novo). Gao argues that he has a well-founded fear of persecution in China because he practices Falun Gong. To establish eligibility for asylum absent past persecution, an applicant must establish that he has an objectively reasonable fear of persecution. See 8 2 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b); Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). “Objective reasonableness entails a showing that a reasonable person in the petitioner’s circumstances would fear persecution if returned to …

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