Gayle v. Sessions

16-3953-ag Gayle v. Sessions UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 10th day of January, two thousand eighteen. PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., REENA RAGGI, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ HOWARD C. GAYLE, a/k/a Owen Anthony Barnes, Petitioner, v. No. 16-3953-ag JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ APPEARING FOR PETITIONER: THOMAS H. NOOTER, Freeman, Nooter & Ginsberg, New York, New York. APPEARING FOR RESPONDENT: MARGARET O’DONNELL, Trial Attorney (Chad A. Readler, Acting 1 Assistant Attorney General, Carl McIntyre, Assistant Director, on the brief), Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioner Howard Gayle, a native and citizen of Jamaica, seeks review of the BIA’s affirmance of an immigration judge’s (“IJ’s”) decision ordering him removed to Jamaica. See In re Howard Gayle, No. A045 439 658 (B.I.A. Nov. 4, 2016), aff’g No. A045 439 658 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. May 28, 2015). Under the circumstances of this case, we review both the IJ’s and BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). In so doing, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to deny the petition. On appeal, Gayle challenges the agency’s determination that his 1999 conviction for reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of New York Penal Law (“NYPL”) § 120.20 constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”), rendering him removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). “We accord Chevron deference to the BIA’s construction of ambiguous statutory terms in immigration law, such as ‘moral turpitude,’” and “review de novo the BIA’s finding that a petitioner’s crime of conviction contains those 2 elements which have been properly found to constitute a CIMT.” Wala v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In making the latter determination, “we apply a categorical approach,” Efstathiadis v. Holder, 752 F.3d 591, 595 (2d Cir. 2014), “look[ing] to the elements ...

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