Gerardo Rodarte-Gonzalez v. Jefferson Sessions, III


NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 7 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT GERARDO RODARTE-GONZALEZ, No. 14-71035 Petitioner, Agency No. A071-864-534 v. MEMORANDUM* JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted August 31, 2018** Seattle, Washington Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges. Gerardo Rodarte-Gonzalez (“Rodarte”), a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the denial of his motion to reopen his 1993 deportation order, which was reinstated in 1998 and again in 2013. Following the second reinstatement, Rodarte filed a motion to reopen “for the purpose of pursuing an * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). application for Cancellation of Removal under the Violence Against Women Act.” An immigration judge (“IJ”) denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) to hear Rodarte’s petition, but not to review his 1993 deportation order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). We deny the petition. We review de novo the BIA’s ruling when the decision turns on a question of law. See Miller v. Sessions, 889 F.3d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 2018). Where, as here, the BIA’s decision interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) “is unpublished and issued by a single member of the BIA, it does not carry the force of law, and is accorded only Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) deference proportional to its thoroughness, reasoning, consistency, and ability to persuade.” Lezama-Garcia v. Holder, 666 F.3d 518, 524–25 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).1 When “the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision and adds some of its own analysis, we review both decisions.” Ling 1 The Attorney General contends that the BIA’s interpretation is entitled to “greater” deference because motions to reopen are “disfavored,” as granting such motions “too freely will permit endless delay of deportation by aliens creative and fertile enough to continuously produce new and material facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case” for relief. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988). But as our recent precedent makes clear, such “deference” does not apply to purely legal questions about whether the immigration court has jurisdiction to adjudicate a motion to reopen. See Miller, 889 F.3d at 1001. 2 Huang v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2014).2 The INA provides the following when it comes to reinstated removal orders: If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally after having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is ...

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