Harrison Kamau v. Jefferson Sessions

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 13 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT HARRISON GACHUKIA KAMAU, No. 13-74358 Petitioner, Agency No. A089-303-397 v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM* Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted December 6, 2017** Seattle, Washington Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges: Harrison Gachukia Kamau, a native and citizen of Kenya, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). humanitarian asylum, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny in part and dismiss in part the petition. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of relief based upon Kamau’s failure to establish both that he was a member of a particular social group and that his membership in that group was a central reason for his persecution. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). Kamau failed to explain how his identified particular social group—Christian males from the Kikuyu tribe who oppose the Mungiki—is recognizable in Kenyan society and, thus, has not shown that the group is socially visible and particular. See Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1088–91 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (requiring that the shared characteristic be “generally . . . recognizable” by other members of the community and querying whether the group “can accurately be described in a manner sufficiently distinct that the group would be recognized, in the society in question, as a discrete class of persons”). Even assuming that Kamau demonstrated that his group is socially visible, he has not shown that he was persecuted “on account of” his membership in that group. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). Specifically, substantial 2 evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that the Mungiki targeted him because of his economic status in the community as the owner of a matatu—a type of minibus. See Ayala v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 1012, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that extortion qualifies as past persecution only when the extortion is motivated by a protected ground); see also Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (“These [economic and personal] motivations do not constitute persecution on account of political opinion.”), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1093. For the same reason, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Kamau failed to established a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his membership in a particular group. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i). The BIA reasoned that Kamau’s claim for withholding of removal failed because his asylum claim failed. That reasoning ...

Original document
Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals