NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 16 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT HECTOR ALFONSO MONZON- No. 19-70064 CAMPOS, Agency No. A087-764-491 Petitioner, v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of an Immigration Judge Submitted March 8, 2022** Phoenix, Arizona Before: PAEZ, CLIFTON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges. Hector Alfonso Monzon-Campos, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of a decision of an immigration judge (IJ) upholding an asylum officer’s negative reasonable fear determination. We deny the petition for review. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Page 2 of 4 1. The proceedings before the IJ did not violate Monzon-Campos’s due process rights. Although non-citizens in reasonable fear proceedings are entitled to due process protections, they are not entitled to all of the same protections granted to persons not previously removed. Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 812 (9th Cir. 2018). The IJ conducts a de novo review of the asylum officer’s determination, and non-citizens are not entitled to present new evidence or testimony in the IJ hearing. Alvarado-Herrera v. Garland, 993 F.3d 1187, 1195 (9th Cir. 2021). Monzon-Campos contends that the IJ failed to conduct a de novo review and to elicit sufficient testimony. However, at the outset of the hearing, the IJ stated that he would review the asylum officer’s decision and reverse it if he disagreed. Nothing in the record suggests that his review was not de novo. Moreover, the IJ questioned Monzon-Campos about the details of his prior testimony and allowed him to provide additional testimony. In these proceedings, Monzon-Campos was not entitled to more. 2. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that the harm Monzon-Campos feared was not related to a protected ground. A petitioner in a reasonable fear proceeding must show a “reasonable possibility” that he will be persecuted on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular Page 3 of 4 social group, or political opinion in the country of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c). Monzon-Campos testified that police and criminals repeatedly extorted him for money, sometimes by violent means. But he also testified that the perpetrators of that extortion targeted him purely because they “think I have money.” Monzon- Campos cannot demonstrate the required nexus to a protected ground when substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that his fear of harm is based exclusively on a “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010). Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s rejection of Monzon-Campos’s claim that the harm he feared was related to his political opinion. Although Monzon- Campos responded “Yes” when the IJ asked whether he would be harmed due …
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