Henriz Brasmin Colon-Calderon v. Attorney General United States

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 17-2425 ___________ HENRIZ BRASMIN COLON-CALDERON, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent ____________________________________ On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A044-659-339) Immigration Judge: Honorable John P. Ellington ____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 8, 2018 Before: VANASKIE, COWEN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: March 9, 2018) ___________ OPINION * ___________ PER CURIAM * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Henriz Brasmin Colon-Calderon, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, petitions for review of a final order of removal. For the following reasons, we will deny the petition. Colon-Calderon was born to alien parents in the Dominican Republic in April 1990. He was admitted to the United States as a conditional resident in June 1994, and adjusted his status to lawful permanent resident in May 2001. In 2015, Colon-Calderon pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and § 841(b)(1)(C). He was sentenced to 21 months of imprisonment. The Government charged Colon-Calderon with removability for having been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(43)(B) [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B)] (illicit trafficking in a controlled substance), INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)], and for having been convicted of a controlled substance offense, INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)]. An Immigration Judge (IJ) concluded that Colon-Calderon was removable as charged; that he was ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal (under both the INA and the Convention Against Torture (CAT)), cancellation of removal, and adjustment of status; and that he was not entitled to deferral of removal under the CAT based on his allegation that he will be “harmed by the corrupt Dominican Police.” On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, Colon-Calderon argued that his conviction did not constitute a “particularly serious crime” and that he obtained derivative United States citizenship from his father, who naturalized in April 2009. The 2 Board rejected these claims, holding that Colon-Calderon failed to overcome the presumption that his drug conviction was a particularly serious crime and concluding that he did not derive citizenship because he was over 18 years of age when his father became a naturalized citizen. Colon-Calderon filed a pro se petition for review of the BIA’s decision. We generally lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal against a criminal alien, like Colon-Calderon, who is removable for having committed an offense covered in § 237(a)(2). See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). We retain jurisdiction, however, to review constitutional claims, “pure questions of law,” and “issues of application of law to fact, where the facts are undisputed and not the subject of challenge.” Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Here, a liberal construction of Colon-Calderon’s pro se brief ...

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