UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HEREDIA MONS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 19-1593 (JEB) KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION Last summer in Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317 (D.D.C. 2018), this Court granted a preliminary injunction to a provisional class of plaintiffs who were challenging the practices of five Immigrations and Customs Enforcement field offices. Specifically, those plaintiffs successfully maintained that ICE was violating the Department of Homeland Security’s “Parole Directive,” a policy memorandum that sets forth procedural requirements for determining whether an asylum-seeker is eligible for pre-hearing release on parole. This suit offers the identical arguments – this time in relation to ICE’s New Orleans Field Office, which Plaintiffs claim has effectively rescinded the Parole Directive, even while publicly reaffirming its vitality. Rather than following the Directive, the Office is allegedly denying all asylum-seekers parole as a matter of policy. In opposing a preliminary injunction and in simultaneously moving to dismiss, the Government principally asserts that the claims of each of the named Plaintiffs here are “moot” – i.e., extinguished, given that they have either had their parole requests re-adjudicated on an individualized basis or are no longer in the custody of the New Orleans Field Office. Therefore, the Government argues, because the named Plaintiffs have 1 already achieved the individualized review that they sought by bringing this lawsuit (or such review is now unavailable to them), the Court is powerless to allow this class action to proceed. This Court is not so constrained. Even assuming that the named Plaintiffs’ claims here are moot, the Court retains jurisdiction over the proposed class. While it is true that class actions are normally moot if no named representative with an unexpired claim remains at the time of certification, see United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1538 (2018), an exception applies where the alleged harms would otherwise evade review because they are “inherently transitory.” Id. Such is the case here. Defeated on their jurisdictional position, Defendants offer little beyond their Damus arguments on the merits. The Court, accordingly, will reach the same result and grant Plaintiffs’ Motion. In issuing an injunction of this nature for a second time, this Court again simply holds the Government to the policy that it purports to already be following. I. Background A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework The Court begins with the relevant statutory and regulatory framework at issue, as it did in its prior decision on the subject of the Parole Directive. See Damus, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 323– 24. The Immigration and Nationality Act outlines the foundations of our nation’s immigration system, including the process by which noncitizens can apply for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). If an interviewing officer determines that an asylum-seeker has a “credible fear” of persecution in her home country, that person “shall be detained for further consideration of [her] application.” Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. ...
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