Hull v. Newtown

*********************************************** The “officially released” date that appears near the be- ginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub- lished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be- ginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publica- tions, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. *********************************************** HULL v. NEWTOWN—DISSENT EVELEIGH, J., dissenting. I respectfully disagree with the majority conclusion that the arrest policy of the Newtown Police Department (department) ‘‘applies solely to the criminal context and therefore does not apply when the police take a person into custody pursu- ant to [General Statutes] § 17a-503 (a).’’ See Newtown Board of Police Commissioners, Newtown Police Policy and Procedure 3.00 (revised February 1, 2005) (Policy Manual). Instead, I would conclude that the plain mean- ing of the word ‘‘[a]rrest,’’ which is defined in the policy as ‘‘[t]aking a person into custody,’’ creates a ministerial duty requiring the police to search anyone who has been taken into custody for whatever reason. Id., pt. III A, p. 1. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. I begin by noting my agreement with the facts and law set forth in the majority opinion. There is, therefore, no need to repeat either at length in this dissent. My differences with the majority opinion lie in the interpre- tation of the Policy Manual. I will add facts and law only when necessary to advance the discussion set forth in this dissent. It should be noted that, after his interaction with Stanley Lupienski, Officer Steven Borges proceeded to fill out a ‘‘police emergency examination request’’ form to be provided to both the ambulance driver and the hospital. The form, which is issued by the Connecticut Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services, contains the following language: ‘‘Any police officer who has reasonable cause to believe that a person has psychiatric disabilities and is dangerous to himself or herself or others or gravely disabled, and in need of immediate care and treatment, may take such person into custody and take or cause such person to be taken to a general hospital for emergency examination under this section. The officer shall execute a written request for emergency examination detailing the circumstances under ...

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