In the United States Court of Federal Claims No. 21-1570C (Filed: May 25, 2022) ) IAP WORLDWIDE SERVICES, INC., ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) ) THE UNITED STATES, ) ) Defendant, ) ) and ) ) VECTRUS SYSTEMS CORPORATION, ) Defendant- ) Intervenor. ) ) Kara L. Daniels, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff. Of counsel were Thomas A. Pettit and Aime JH Joo. Tanya B. Koenig, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendant. With her on the briefs were Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, and Reginald T. Blades, Jr., Assistant Director. Of counsel was Lieutenant Colonel Seth Ritzman, Contract Litigation & Intellectual Property Division, United States Army Legal Services Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA. Adam K. Lasky, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Intervenor. Of counsel were Edward V. Arnold, Stephanie B. Magnell, and Bret C. Marfut, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Washington, D.C. OPINION AND ORDER SOLOMSON, Judge. This Court previously concluded that Plaintiff, IAP Worldwide Services, Inc. (“IAP”), succeeded on the merits of Count I of its amended complaint. ECF No. 54; IAP Worldwide Servs., Inc. v. United States, -- Fed Cl. --, 2022 WL 1021781, at *46 (2022). Specifically, the Court held that while Defendant, the United States, acting by and through the U.S. Department of the Army (the “Army”), as a general matter, has “discretion to decline to conduct discussions here,” the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement’s (“DFARS”) “presumption favoring discussions must be overcome with reasoned decision-making not reflected in the administrative record at issue.” IAP Worldwide Servs., 2022 WL 1021781, at *39 (discussing DFARS 215.306). In essence, this Court concluded that the Army failed to properly apply DFARS 215.306 in deciding not to establish a competitive range and, thus, not to engage in discussions with offerors, including IAP. Id. at *35–39. Because of the inadequate record regarding appropriate relief, however, the Court was “unprepared . . . to order the government to go back and redo its procurement process,” or to otherwise decide the question of equitable or monetary relief absent “[a]dditional factual development.” Id. at *50 (citing PGBA, LLC v. United States, 389 F.3d 1219, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Having “reserve[d] the question of appropriate relief in this case pending further briefing,” id. at *53, the Court ordered supplemental briefing and permitted the submission of additional factual declarations to support the parties’ respective positions, ECF No. 52. The parties filed their respective supplemental briefs and accompanying declarations on April 11, 2022. ECF No. 55 (“Pl. Supp. Br.”); ECF No. 56 (“Def. Supp. Br.”); ECF No. 57 (“Intv. Supp. Br.”). The parties’ positions could scarcely be further apart. IAP contends that it is entitled to injunctive relief “requir[ing] the Army to apply DFARS 215.306 correctly and proceed accordingly.” Pl. Supp. Br. at 10. IAP also argues that this Court should award bid and proposal costs “in addition to the tailored injunctive relief requested.” Id. The government opposes IAP …
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