NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 23 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT IGNACIO VALENCIA-AREVALO, No. 15-72966 Petitioner, Agency No. A205-699-365 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted May 17, 2022** Seattle, Washington Before: WARDLAW, GOULD, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges. Ignacio Valencia-Arevalo, a native and citizen of Mexico, challenges the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) to deny his applications for asylum and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) and deny the petition. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Petitioner entered the United States without inspection, admission, or parole in 2007, when he was 13. He testified before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that when he was 19, he was arrested for stealing property with his friend Alfonso Rincon. Petitioner told the police where Rincon lived and pointed out his home. While incarcerated in the same jail, Rincon threatened Petitioner and his family. Petitioner learned that Rincon had been selling drugs and became “afraid that [Rincon] could be some member of a cartel or . . . crime organization in Mexico.” Petitioner feared Rincon or a drug-trafficking organization (“DTO”) with which he was affiliated would torture or kill him if he returned to Mexico. Petitioner acknowledged that he does not know if Rincon has ties to “criminal elements in Mexico.” The IJ found Petitioner credible. The IJ found that Petitioner’s asylum application was time-barred pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). To qualify for an exception, Petitioner must show either changed circumstances that materially affect his eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances directly related to the delay. Id. § 1158(a)(2)(D). Petitioner claimed changed circumstances under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)(i)(B) because he became “involved in [activities] outside the country of feared persecution that place [him] at risk.” He feared that Rincon would “harm him as revenge for speaking to [the] police about [Rincon’s] involvement in criminal activity.” The IJ found that Petitioner “cannot use [Rincon’s] alleged threats as a claim for the delay 2 in filing” because Rincon may not presently reside in Mexico. Alternatively, the IJ found that Petitioner failed to show past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group (“PSG”), or political opinion. The IJ found Petitioner’s PSG of “[p]eople who have cooperated with authorities in criminal prosecutions of members of DTOs’ is not particular or social[ly] visible.” The IJ also found Petitioner’s other PSG—Mexicans returning from the U.S.—too broad, under our precedent, to qualify as a cognizable PSG. See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2010). As to the CAT claim, the …
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