USCA11 Case: 20-13821 Date Filed: 08/06/2021 Page: 1 of 7 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________ No. 20-13821 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________ Agency No. A205-007-783 IMBERT ROMERO-JAIMES, Petitioner, versus U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. ________________________ Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ________________________ (August 6, 2021) Before JORDAN, NEWSOM and GRANT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 20-13821 Date Filed: 08/06/2021 Page: 2 of 7 Imbert Romero-Jaimes seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order affirming the Immigration Judge’s denial of his application for cancellation of removal under Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). He first argues that the IJ erred in finding that he was not continuously physically present in the United States for ten years. Romero-Jaimes also raises substantive-due-process and equal-protection challenges to the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard in INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). We dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part. I First up, Romero-Jaimes’s argument about the IJ’s finding on continuous physical presence. Because we review the IJ’s decision only to the extent the BIA adopts it as its own, Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1350 (11th Cir. 2009), where an issue reached by the IJ doesn’t form a part of the BIA’s decision, that issue is not properly before us, Gonzales v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 403 (11th Cir. 2016). Here, the IJ determined that Romero-Jaimes did not meet one of the necessary preconditions to be eligible for the discretionary relief of cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)—that of continuous physical presence in the United States for at least ten years preceding an application for cancellation of removal. But the BIA did not adopt that ground for its decision. 2 USCA11 Case: 20-13821 Date Filed: 08/06/2021 Page: 3 of 7 Instead, it said that it was not addressing the issue of continuous physical presence at all. So, because that issue formed no part of the BIA’s decision, it plays no part in our review. See Gonzalez, 820 F.3d at 403; Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1219, 1221 n.2 (11th Cir. 2006). II Next, we address Romero-Jaimes’s challenges to the constitutionality of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard in INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). The Attorney General has discretion to grant cancellation of removal to an alien who shows, among other things, that “removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s … child, who is a citizen of the United States[.]” INA § 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). In determining whether removal would result in such hardship, the BIA considers various factors “in the aggregate,” including “the ages, health, and circumstances of [the] qualifying [relative],” whether the alien has “a qualifying child with very serious health issues, or compelling special needs in school,” and whether the qualifying relative would experience “[a] lower standard …
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