FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 19 2020 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT INGRI YAMILETH CANAS-MELENDEZ; No. 17-73487 ASHLY MICHELL AGUILAR-CANAS, Agency Nos. A202-078-835 Petitioners, A202-078-834 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted June 5, 2020** Pasadena, California Before: RAWLINSON and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,*** District Judge. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation. Ingri Yamileth Canas-Melendez, a citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 We have jurisdiction under section 242(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. Molina-Estrada v. I.N.S., 293 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2002); I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Where, as here, “the BIA’s analysis on the relevant issues is confined to a simple statement of a conclusion, we also look to the IJ’s oral decision as a guide to what lay behind the BIA’s conclusion.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 1. To establish eligibility for a discretionary grant of asylum, an alien must demonstrate that she has suffered past persecution or has “a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Canas-Melendez claims persecution as a member of the particular social group defined as “Salvadoran women unable to leave an abusive domestic relationship.” But even assuming that 1 Canaz-Melendez’s daughter Ashly also applied for relief, but her application is derivative. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A). 2 17-73487 her proposed group was cognizable under the INA, an issue which we do not resolve, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Canas-Melendez failed to establish her membership in that putative social group because she failed to establish that she was unable to leave her abusive domestic relationship. The IJ acknowledged Canas-Melendez’s testimony that her partner, Jose, once threatened to harm her or her family if she tried to leave him. But the IJ noted that for three years, neither Canas-Melendez nor her parents asked him to leave or ever called the police or sought other assistance. The IJ noted that, when her parents finally did ask him to leave, “he apparently had no problems with leaving her or her family’s home.” The IJ found ...
Original document
Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals