International Assoc. of Machin v. Ray Allen


In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 17‐1178 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS DISTRICT TEN and LOCAL LODGE 873, Plaintiff‐Appellee, v. RAY ALLEN, in his capacity as Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, et al., Defendants‐Appellants. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. No. 16‐CV‐77 — William M. Conley, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED SEPTEMBER 15, 2017 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2018 ____________________ Before MANION, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Wisconsin’s Act 1 of 2015, codi‐ fied at Wis. Stat. § 111.01 et seq., changed many provisions of that State’s labor laws. This case deals with a narrow provi‐ sion of Act 1 that attempts to change the rules for payroll de‐ ductions that allow employees to pay union dues through dues‐checkoff authorizations. 2 No. 17‐1178 A dues‐checkoff authorization is a contract between an employer and employee for payroll deductions. These are “arrangements whereby [employers] would check off from employee wages amounts owed to a labor organization for dues, initiation fees and assessments.” Felter v. Southern Pacific Co., 359 U.S. 326, 330–31 (1958). By signing an authorization, the employee directs the employer to deduct union dues or fees routinely from the employee’s paycheck and to remit those funds to the applicable union. Many of these authoriza‐ tions are irrevocable for a specified period—often one year— for reasons of administrative simplicity. See Dkt. 43 at 2 (Eli‐ zondo Aff.); see also N.L.R.B. v. Atlanta Printing Specialties and Paper Prods. Union 527, 523 F.2d 783, 786 (5th Cir. 1975). The union itself is not a party to the authorization, which is effec‐ tive if and only if the employee wishes. Federal law has long provided, however, that unions can bargain collectively with employers over the standard terms of dues‐checkoff authori‐ zations. The Taft‐Hartley Act imposes three limits on dues‐ checkoff authorizations: the authorization must be (1) indi‐ vidual for each employee, (2) in writing, and (3) irrevocable for no longer than one year. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2), (c)(4). Wisconsin’s Act 1 attempts to shorten this maximum period to thirty days. See 2015 Wis. Act 1, § 9, codified at Wis. Stat. § 111.06(1)(i). The district court found that Wisconsin’s attempt to im‐ pose its own time limit on dues‐checkoff authorizations is preempted by federal labor law, and the court issued a per‐ manent injunction barring enforcement of that provision. In‐ ternational Ass’n of Machinists District 10 v. Allen, No. 16‐cv‐77, 2016 WL 7475720, at *7 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 28, 2016). We affirm. No. 17‐1178 3 This case is controlled by the Supreme Court’s summary af‐ firmance in a case finding a nearly identical State law preempted. Sea Pak v. Indus., Tech. & Prof. Employees, Div. of Nat’l Maritime Union, 400 U.S. 985 (1971) (mem.). We reject Wisconsin’s effort to undermine the precedential force of Sea Pak, which is fully consistent with more general federal labor law preemption principles. See, e.g., Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commʹn, ...

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