NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 14 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT IRMA BRITO-MARTINEZ, Nos. 19-71528 & 20-70615 Petitioner, Agency No. A089-589-713 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petitions for Review of Orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted May 10, 2021** Pasadena, California Before: R. NELSON and BADE, Circuit Judges, and HELLERSTEIN,*** District Judge. Irma Brito-Martinez, a native and citizen of Venezuela, petitions for review of two orders issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), on May 22, 2019 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Alvin K. Hellerstein, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. and February 10, 2020. The 2019 order vacated an immigration judge’s (“IJ’s”) decision granting Petitioner protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The 2020 order denied Petitioner’s motion to reopen her petition for adjustment of status, asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT on the ground of changed conditions. Petitioner argues that the BIA erred in reversing the IJ’s grant of relief under the CAT and abused its discretion in denying her motion to reopen proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny both petitions. We review an agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence, and “[t]he agency’s ‘findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Petitioner failed to establish eligibility for CAT protection. To receive CAT relief, Petitioner must show that she would “more likely than not” be tortured if removed. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c)(2), 208.17(a). Petitioner must prove “a chance greater than fifty percent that [s]he will be tortured” if removed to Venezuela, Hamoui v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 2004), and that the torture would be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a [Venezuelan] public official or other person acting in an official capacity,” Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 771 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1)). 2 Here, Petitioner has cited only general concerns of Venezuela’s political instability, high crime rate, and deteriorating economic climate—conditions that affect all Venezuelan citizens. She has not pointed to any evidence showing that it is more likely than not that she would be tortured by, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a Venezuelan public official. And she is “not too sure” who would be interested in torturing her in Venezuela. The BIA recognized that, although some of Petitioner’s family members were killed in Venezuela, there was no evidence that their deaths were because of their …
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